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ABSTRACT 
This paper begins by introducing the idea that State sovereignty 1s an 
organising p1inciple that provides the context for the exercise of public power, but 
that it is being challenged by the forces of globalisation and replaced by a new regime 
of global governance. It suggests that ew Zealand's free trade agreements illustrate 
how New Zealand is bound into the new system of global governance, and how New 
Zealand's State sovereignty has been redefined within that system. 
Part IT summarises the concept of sovereignty and, more specifically, the 
traditional notion of State sovereignty. It then describes how globalisation is 
challenging the traditional notion of State sovereignty. Part Ill deals with various 
provisions of New Zealand's bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements to show 
how they depict New Zealand's place within the web of global economic goven1ance, 
and how they represent a redefinition of New Zealand's sovereignty. 
Part IV outlines some of tbe political realities that smTotmd free trade and 
global governance to illustrate that even though New Zealand retains the right to 
unilaterally withdraw from the international treaties it has signed, it is politically 
prohibited from doing so . It is these political realities that ultimately mean New 
Zealand has sunendered aspects of its State sovereignty into the international arena. 
The paper concludes by making some preliminary judgements about whether 
the redefinition of State sovereignty in a globalised world is positive or negative. 
While not lamenting the passing of State sovereignty as the context for the exercise of 
public power per se, it does suggest that there are serious problems associated with the 
cunent model of global governance that detract from the legitimacy of tl1e system. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 13,882 words. 
4 
I INTRODUCTION 
Public law is about power. It deals with who makes public decisions, 
how they make them, and bow they can be influenced in the content of their 
decisions. 1 Therefore, a concept central to public law and public decision-
making is that of "sovereignty", because it conveys the notion of supreme power. 
State sovereignty - the idea that States have exclusive and absolute power to 
detem1ine their own domestic affairs - has been tbe organising principle for the 
exercise of power since the mid-fifteenth cenhrry. It provided the context for the 
exercise of power by delimiting who could make decisions and wbo could 
influence them. In the twenty-first century, however, the traditional notion of 
State sovereignty is under attack. The phenomenon known as "globalisation" is 
said to present a challenge to State sovereignty as the ultimate organising 
principle at the international level. Whereas according to the tradibonal principle 
of State sovereignty States had absolute ,md exclusive domain over their 
domestic affairs, globalisation bas led to a new era of "global governance" in 
which aspects of States' internal affairs are determined by actors beyond their 
borders. 
There are vast quantities of academic literature devoted to explaining bow 
States are no longer free to determine their own domestic affairs in isolation from 
the outside world .2 The basic contention of many authors is that in an 
increasingly globalised world, decision-making is dispersed among a variety of 
different entities, thereby doing away with the State's monopoly on power. 3 This 
is not to say that States have become inelevant or powerless; only that they are 
no longer the exclusive determinants of their own domestic affairs. Part II of this 
paper is devoted to outlining the traditional notion of State sovereignty that 
1 See GWR Palmer "The New Public Law: Its Province and Function" (1991) 22 VCWLR 8. 
2 One example is the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, which was foLmded 111 1993 to 
focus on the intersection of global and domestic legal regimes, markets, politics, technologies and 
cultures. 
3 For example, see David Held Democracy and the Global Order: From the Madan Srate to 
Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford University Press, Stanford (Cal), 1995); .lane Kelsey 
Reclaiming the Future: New Zealand and the Global Economy (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, 1999); Daniel K Taru11o "Law and Governance in a Global Economy" (1999) 93 
ASIL Proceedings 105; Michael Hart "The WTO and the Political Economy of Globalisation" 
(1999) 33 Journal of World Trade 75. 
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ascribed absolute and exclusive power to States, and then explaining bow a 
convergence of forces has caused a rethink of that notion. 
There are many forces behind globalisation, and the ways in which it 
impacts upon States are varied. One major force is the push towards a global 
economy, in which private fim1s transcend national borders, and goods, services 
and capital investment flow freely between States. New Zealand's free trade 
agreements help define New Zealand's place in the newly globalising world, in 
particular the new web of global economic governance. Paii III examines the 
Agreements because they impose binding rules and obligations, thereby 
establishing a comprehensive legal regime that ties ew Zealand into the system 
of global economic governance, giving actors beyond ew Zealand ' s borders 
influence over Jew Zealand's law and policy. In establishing such a regime, the 
Agreements go to the heart of New Zealand's public law: they directly affect 
how power is exercised in New Zealand. Part III concludes that New Zealand's 
free trade agreements provide a clear illustration of how New Zealand no longer 
enjoys an exclusive right to dete1111ine its own internal law. The Agreements 
thus represent the redefinition of New Zea.land's State sovereignty brought about 
by the wider process of globalisation. 
When discussing globalisation, and in paiiicular its economic aspects, it is 
importai1t to consider the realities of the world's political economy. For it is 
these realities that arguably lock States into the new regime of global economic 
governance, and may in fact "force" States to relinquish aspects of their 
sovereignty to the international arena. Paii IV outlines these realities and 
i11ustrates how they do indeed lock New Zealai1d into its free trade agreements. 
It should be noted that this paper aims to illustrate how ew Zealand's 
free trade agreements play a significant part in an evolving redefinition of ew 
Zealai1d's sovereignty. It does not attempt to extol or deny the vi1it1es of free 
trade per se. Such a discussion would take the paper out of the realm of law and 
into complicated arguments about the economic and social impact of free trade. 
This lack of attention is not to deny the importance of such discussion and 
debate, but to recognise that this paper is essentially about the impact ·of New 
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Zealand's free trade agreements on New Zealand's lawmaking powers and 
processes. 
Similarly, the paper does not attempt to pass any definitive judgement 
upon whether any redefinition of New Zealand's State sovereignty is a positive 
or negative thing. Having said that, rather than simply accepting globalisation 
and the accompanying redefinition of State sovereignty has inevitable, it does 
suggest that the new regime of global governance may contain the seeds of a 
"new world order" that is worth embracing. It points out that the cmrent model 
of global governance suffers from some serious difficulties, and that these must 
be overcome to give the new regime a much greater degree of legitimacy and 
sustainability. 
II TRADITIONAL STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND HOW 
GLOBALISATION IS REDEFINING IT 
A The Concept of Sovereignty 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "sovereignty" as:4 
TI1e supreme, absolute and uncontrollable power by which any 
independent State is governed; supreme political authority; the supreme will; 
paramount control of the constitution and frame of governmenr and its 
adminisu-ation; the self-sufficient source of political power, from which all 
specific political powers are derived; the international independence of a State. 
combined with the right and power of re6rulating its internal affairs without 
foreign dictation; also a political society, or State, which is sovereign and 
independent. 
This modem definition reflects many years of thinking about the nature 
and scope of sovereignty. In 1576, Jean Bodin developed what is commonly 
regarded as the first Statement of the modern theory of sovereignty. 5 
4 Joseph R Nolan and Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley (eds) Black ·.1· Law Dictionmy (6 ed, West 
Publishing Co, St Paul (Minn), 1990) 1396 ( emphasis added ). 
5 David Held Democracy and the Global Order: From the Morlern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance (Stanford University Press, Stanford (Cal), 1995) 39. 
7 
Sovereignty, he said, was the untrammeled and undivided power of States to 
make laws, and the right to impose those laws on all subjects regardless of their 
consent. Crucial to this was the fact that the sovereign could 11ot be subject to the 
commands of another, and that the only limits on sovereignty were morals and 
religion, and the need to respect the laws of God, nature and custom. 6 Seventy-
five years after Bodin, Thomas Hobbes considered the nature of sovereignty in 
his famous work, The Leviaihan.7 In Hobbes' opinion, it was in individuals' 
interests to surrender their rights of self-government to the State, for only the 
State could create effective political mle and provide individuals with security 
and peace in the long term. In order to deliver security and peace, the State's 
sovereignty had to be self-perpetuating, undivided and ultimately absolute. 
Within its territory, therefore, the State could use whatever laws, institutions and 
coercive pO\;vers were required to deliver security and peace. The only limit on 
this power is that the State had no wana.nt to injure individuals themselves, or 
harm the bases of their material wellbeing. 
The theories of Bodin and Hobbes vest sovereignty within tl1e State itself, 
even though the State exercises its power for the benefit of its subjects. Later 
theorists such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that sovereignty 
is ultimately vested in the people themselves. 8 Their arguments, which were the 
begi1mings of the moden.1 conception of popular sovereignty,9 stipulated that 
supreme power was the inalienable right of the people, and while a government 
enjoyed political authority, it was a delegated authority held on trust. 10 Thus the 
notion of "consent" became an important part of sovereignty: that those 
subjected to the rule of the State had to agree to their subjection. Of course this 
6 Jea11 Bodin Six Livres de la Repubfique (1576) in Held, above, 40. 
7 Thomas Hobbes The Leviathan ( l 651) in Held, above, 41. 
8 John Locke The Two Treatises uf Governmenr (1690); Jean-Jacques Rousseau Social Cuntrnc:t 
(1762) in Held, above, 42-45. 
9 David Held Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern Staie ro Cosmopolitan 
Governance (Stanford University Press, Stanford (Cal), 1995) 42. 
10 Rousseau actually went further by contending that sovereignty originates in rhe people and 
ought to remain there. The very essence of sovereignty, according to Rousseau, is the creation, 
authorisation and enactment of the law according to the standards and requirements of the 
conm1on good. Only citizens themselves can articulate the common good through public 
discourse, deliberation and agreement. Citizens can only be fully obligated to a sysrern of laws 
and regulations they have prescribed for themselves with the general good in mind: see Rousseau 
Social Contract (1762) in Held, above, 44-45. 
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early notion of consent sowed the seeds for universal suffrage and the n1odern 
theo1ies of democracy. 11 
A common thread of these theories about State sovereignty is that a State 
has, within its territory, illimitable and indivisible power to make laws and 
enforce them over the people within that State. Or to put it another way, States 
are regarded as independent in all matters of internal politics, and the political 
commu11ity within a State is free to detennine its own direction and policies 
without interference from other powers.
12 It should perhaps be noted at this point 
that sovereignty has both an internal and external dimension. The internal 
dimension of sovereignty involves the belief that a ce1iain political body is 
rightly established as a sovereign within a particular society. Different societies 
have varying arrangements for the exercise of sovereignty within their territory. 
In New Zealand, for example, Parliament is said to be sovereign, although 
political realities and the other two branches of govennnent - the Executive and 
Judiciary - act as a check upon its power. In countries with federal systems of 
government, such as Australia, Canada and the United States, internal 
sovereignty is divided between the institutions of the federal government and the 
institutions of the state or provincial governments. The external dimension of 
sovereignty involves the claim that there is no authority above and beyond the 
sovereign State. It is this external dimension that is the focus of this paper, for 
the paper's contention is that there is now authoiity above and beyond the 
sovereign State of New Zealand. New Zealand's State sovereignty has , in other 
words, undergone a redefinition from the traditional notion as espoLtsed by 
theo1ists such as Bodin, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. 
B The Traditional Notion of bxternal Sovereignty 
The Peace of Westphalia 1648 is generally regarded as the beginning of 
the modern State system, of which the traditional notion of State sovereignty is 
the cornerstone. That treaty established w1equivocally that each State has 
11 Andrew Heywood Political Ideologies: An Introduction (MacMillan Education L imited, 
London, 1992) 271. 
supreme authority over all matters that fall within its tenitorial domain. Three 
crucial norms stem from this central principle. First, all sovereign States have 
equal rights. Second, the tenitorial integrity and political independence of 
sovereign States is inviolable. And third, intervention in the domestic affairs of 
sovereign States is not pennissible. These principles fonn part of the corpus of 
public international law and are well recognised by domestic courts, international 
courts and arbitrations, and international treaties. In 1812, for instance, the 
United States Supreme Courl noted that the jurisdiction of a nation within its 
own tenitory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. 13 In 1928 tbe notable 
international lawyer and arbitrator, Max Huber, said: 14 
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. 
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, 
to the exclusion of a11y other State, the functions of a State. The development of 
the national organisation of States during the last few centuries and, as a 
corollary, the de".elopment of international law, have established this principle 
of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own territory in such a 
way as to make it the point of departure in settling most questions that concern 
international relations . .. 
The Charter of the United Nations recogmses State sovereignty and 
confirn1s that all States are equal, that no State shall use force against the 
tenitorial integrity or political independence of another State, and that nothing in 
the Charter authorises any interference in tbe domestic affairs of any Slate. 15 
More recently, the United Nations General Assembly bas affirmed the same 
. . 1 16 pnnc1p es. 
In spite of some of the rhetoric expressed above, sovereign States have 
never had absolute power to perfo1m whatever actions they please withi11 their 
12 David Held Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State ro Cosmopolitan 
Governance (Stanford University Press, Stanford (Cal), 1995) 100. 
13 The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812) 7 Cranch 116, per Marshall CJ. 
14 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v US) (1928) 2 RLA..A 829. 
15 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 145 UKFS 805, ans 2(1), 2(4), 2(7) (Charter of 
the United Nations). 
16 1970 Declaration on Principles of lnternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 
2625(XXV); 1974 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, UNGA Res 3314(XX1X), 
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territory. The most obvious restriction on State sovereignty, and one already 
identified by the United Nations Charter, is that States cannot exercise their 
sovereign powers to impinge upon the sovereignty or territorial integrity of other 
States. 17 This point was clearly elaborated by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the famous Lotus Case of 1927: 18 
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law 
upon a State is that - failing the existence of a permissible rule to the contrary -
it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this 
sense jmisdiction is certainly tenitorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside 
its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international 
custom or from a convention.
19 
The same point is widely recognised in later international law cases and 
arbitrations, international treaties and United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions. 20 The second major exception to the principle that a State's power is 
exclusive and absolute within its territory is tbat States may voluntarily impose 
limitations on their own domestic sovereignty. 21 States usually do this by 
becoming parties to international h·eaties that impose certain limits and/or 
obligations in respect of their domestic affairs. Then, under the basic 
international law 1101111 of pacta sunt servanda, States uphold and implement the 
provisions of the treaties they sign. For example, about 200 of New Zealand's 
600-700 stah1tes are affected in one way or another by ew Zealand's 
international law obligations.22 International law is replete with examples where 
sovereignty of the nation-state has been subordinated to some external set of 
17 Charter of the United Nations, art 2(4). 
18 The Lotus Case (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ Reports, Series A, No l 0, 3. 
19 An example of a convention by which each party permits the other parues to exercise 
jurisdiction within their territory is the North American Treaty Organisation (NATO) Status of 
Forces Agreement 1951, by which each party is pemutted to exercise jurisdiction over its forces 
stationed in the tenitory of the other parties. 
2° Charter of the United Nations, art 2(4); Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v liS) ( 1928) 2 
RIAA 829; Trail Smelrer Case (1938-1941) 3 RIAA 1905; 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, 1) NGA Res 2625(XXV); 1974 Resolution on the 
Definition of Aggression, UNGA Res 3314(XXIX). 
21 In The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon MaTShall CJ said that the jurisdiction of a nation 
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. He immediately went on to say that 
such exclusive and absolute jurisdiction is susceptible to any self-imposed limitations: see The 
Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812) 7 Cranch 116. 
22 Sir Kenneth Keiti1 "Governance, Sovereignty and Globalisation" (1998) 28 VUWLR 477,485. 
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rules, in areas ranging from human rights, nuclear disarmament, the environment 
and trade. Paradoxically, these incursions into State authority have traditionally 
been justified as the voluntary exercise of sovereign power, either tln·ough an act 
of State or parliamentary mandate. 23 Moreover, they are not seen as inconsistent 
with the doctrine of State sovereignty because States retain the ability to 
tmilaterally withdraw from any international treaty, thereby regammg any 
sovereignty they might have lost in originally signing the treaty. 
In the last 60 years smce the end of World War II, the number of 
international treaties entered into by States, and the range of areas they regulate, 
has greatly increased. In addition, the depth of obli gation and limitation imposed 
by international treaties is much more significant. As a result, States are more 
closely interco1mected than ever before. This intercom1ection of States via 
international law is one facet of the process lmown as "globalisation". W11ile 
globalisation does not formally attempt to redefine the traditional doctrine of 
State sovereignty, the contention of many co1mnentators is that it does so 
regardless. 
C State Sovereignty Challenged in an Increasingly Globalised World 
The process known as "globalisation" is the subject of massive academic 
and social debate. While it means different things in different contexts, the 
underlying theme of globalisation is that State borders are breaking down and 
nation-states are becoming less relevant. Global processes result from a variety 
of different forces, including cross-border problems such as ozone depletion, 
changes to the world's political economy, and the advent of new technologies 
that permit greater movement of people and instantaneous global 
2
' Jane Kelsey "Globalisation, State and Law: Towards a 'Multi-Perspect1val Polity'" in 
Australasian Law Teachers' Association Cross Currents: Jnternmionalism, National Identity and 
law (Australasian Law Teachers' Association , 1995) <http://www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 
10 September 2001) 1. In New Zealand it is the prerogative of the Executive to ratify 
international treaties, although new procedures introduced in 1999 gave Parliament a limited role 
in the ratification process: see Jane Kelsey Reclaiming the Future: New Zealand and the Global 
Economy (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1999) 49. 
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co1m1mnication.24 In response to these global processes, States have willingly 
and progressively devolved power and authority to transnational non-territorial 
institutions and actors, the net result of which has been the development of some 
notion of "global govemance". 25 The Commission on Global Governance 
provides an explanation of this new phenomenon called "global govemance":
26 
Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions manage their 
common affairs, and is a continuing process through which conflicting interests 
may be accommodated . .. At a global level, governance has been viewed primarily 
as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as involvmg non-
government organisations, citizens' movements, multinational corporations and the 
global capital market. 
The Commission's Report refers to the fact that global governance is not 
itself a new phenomenon. The nineteenth century, for example, was a time of 
deepening integration and unprecedented expansion of trade, investment flows 
and migration of people. Some world-wide governance was provided by the 
cooperation of States and compliance with the basic nom1s of international law, 
but it mostly occurred without fonnalised global rules or institutions. This was 
tmsustainable because it was dependent on self-regulated markets that were 
prone to crisis, and without strong international rules and institutions the most 
powerful nations acted unilaterally and tried to control the system.
27 In contrast, 
the cmrent era of globalisation is producing governance at the international level 
comprised of international law and international organisations, which regulate 
everything from human rights to the exploitation of natural resources.
28 
Generally speaking, these international organisations exist to ensure States 
comply with certain rules of international law. Most famously, the Uni ted 
Nations exists to ensure that all nations comply with its Chaiier, which among 
24 Alfred C Aman Jr "Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: An Introduction" 111 The 
Globalisation ojLaw, Politics and Markets: Implicaiions for Domestic Law Refhrm ( 199 3) l Ind 
J Global Legal Stud 1, 1-2. 
25 Christian Reus-Smit "Changing Patterns of Governance: From Absolutism to Global 
Multilateralism" in Albert J Paolini. Anthony P Jarvis and Cluistian Reus-Smit (eds) Between 
Sovereignty and Global Governance.· the United Nations, the Stare and Civil Society (MacMillan 
Press, New York, 1998) 8. 
26 The Conm1ission on Global Governance Our Global Neighbourhoorl (Oxford Universi t y Press, 
New York, 1995) 2-3. 
27 The Commission on Global Governance, above, 149. 
13 
other things, requires States to settle their disputes peacefully, and to refrain from 
the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other 
States.29 
The web of global governance extends into the economic sphere. There 
is a significant body of international economic law promulgated by both States 
and international institutions that imposes substantive obligations on States. 
30 
Notable examples of international economic law include the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) Agreements, regional trade agreements such as Closer 
Economic Relations (CER) between Australia and New Zealand and the I01ih-
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and otber international treaties dealing 
with specific aspects of international commerce, such as the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sa.le of Goods. The institutions 
responsible for this array of international economic law are primari I y the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the \:Vorld Bank, the WTO, various United 
Nations committees responsible for codifying p1,iva.te international law, such as 
the United Nations Conunission on International Trade Law (UNCJTRAL), and 
a range of non-governmental bodies responsible fo r international standard 
setting, such as the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNID RO IT). According to Christian Reus-Smit, this promulgation of 
international econo1mc law and the creation of international economic 
organisations marks a movement towards global multilateralism and a 
framework for a system of transnational governance. 
31 
One contention is that the regime of global governance that bas emerged, 
consisting of international instih1tions responsibl e for enforcing international 
law, necessarily involves a redefinition of State sovereignty. For wbile States 
28 Christian Reus-Smit, above, 6, 20-21 . 
29 Charter of the United Nations, arts 2(3), 2(4). 
30 International economic law can be defined as any internat1onal treaties or customary 
international laws that embrace goods, services and investment when they are involved in 
transactions that cross national borders. It also covers any law involving the establishment on 
national territory of economic activity of persons or firms originating from outside that territory: 
see Jolm H Jackson "The World Trading System" in John H Jackson, William J Davey & Alan 0 
Sykes Jr (eds) Legal Problems of International Economic Relmions (3 ed, West Publishing 
Company, St Paul (Minn), 1995) 26 
3 1 Christian Reus-Smit, above, 11. 
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have played a major role in the creation and application of the new global legal 
regimes, in doing so they have transfened a large area of tbeir internal authority 
to the international domain. 32 In an increasingly interdependent world national 
bom1dru:ies become increasingly permeable so that old notions of territoriality, 
independence and non-intervention lose some of their meaning. 33 
An examination of international human rights law provides one of the 
clearest illustrations of international institutions using international law to 
impose substantive limits on States. Human rights charters such as tbe 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
provide evidence of a shift from the principle that State sovereignty must be 
safeguarded irrespective of its consequences for individuals, groups and 
organisations. 34 In Xv Sweden the European Commission of Human Rigbts 
. d 1 35 recogmse t 1at: 
... a State which signs and ratifies the European Convent1011 for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms must be understood as 
agreeing to restTict the free exercise of its rights under general international law, 
including the right to control the entry and exit of foreigners, to tbe extent and 
within the limits of the obligations which it has accepted under that Convention. 
In other words, once a State chooses to subject itself to the obligations 
contained in the Convention, it is no longer free to exercise its sovereignty in a 
maru1er that breaches those obligations. Similarly, as States enter inten1mional 
economic agreements, they lose some ability to determine domestic economic 
policy in isolation from international influences. Kelsey submits tbat agreements 
such as CER, the Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) between New Zealand and 
Singapore, and the WTO Agreements aim to create loose economic and 
32 Oscar Schachter "The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for Jnternational Law" 
( 1997) 36 Colombia Journal of Transnational Law 7, 11. 
33 The Commission on Global Governance Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1995) 70. 
34 David Held Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern Stare ro Cosmopolitan 
Governance (Stanford University Press, Stanford (Cal), 1995) 103. 
35 Xv Sweden Application No. 434/58, 30 June 1959, 2 ECHR 354, 372. 
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regulatory integration of State economies.36 In other words, States are bound 
together by international economic law and through international institutions so 
that each influences the others' economic policy. This erodes the authority and 
autonomy of the nation-state to determine its own economic policy. In addition, 
private transnational enterprise exercises power, which owing to the enormous 
resources at its disposal, may at times be more potent than the authority exercised 
by States. All this, according to Kelsey, points to the modern reality whereby 
econo1mc, political and regulatory power is exercised by diverse pubbc and 
private agents dispersed across the globe. 37 
It is in this context that ew Zealand's free trade agreements are 
examined. For the free trade agreements to which New Zealand is a party -
CER, CEP and the WTO Agreements - largely define ew Zealand's place in 
the regime of global economic governance. When examined, the Agreements 
provide a practical illustration of the foregoing material, and show that New 
Zealand has in signing its free trade agreements transferred aspects of its national 
sovereignty into the international arena. In many respects, New Zealand is no 
longer free to detern1ine much of its law and regulation independently from 
influences outside its national borders. 
III NEW ZEALAND'S FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: AN 
ILLUSTRATION OF NEW ZEALAND'S STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
REDEFINED 
The framework of global trade is established and governed by a multitude 
of bilateral , multilateral ru1d plurilateral agreements between nations. New 
Zealand's place in the international trading system is governed by tlu·ee rnaJ or 
agreements: 
36 Jane Kelsey "Globalisation, State and Law: Towards a 'ML1lti-Perspectival Polity"' in 
Australasian Law Teachers' Association Cross Currents: Internationalism. Na1ionul Jde11tity and 
law (Australasian Law Teachers' Association, 1995) <http ://www .austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 
10 September 2001) 1. 
37 Kelsey, above, 2. 
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(a) The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
1983 (CER);38 
(b) The Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic 
Paiinership 2000 (CEP);39 
(c) The World Trade Organisation Agreement 1994.40 
The first of New Zealai1d's bilateral free trade agreements, CER, entered 
into force on 1 January 1983. It is now the main instrument governing economic 
relations between Australia and New Zealai1d. CER establishes a free trade area 
between New Zealand and Australia,41 and aims to strengthen the relationship 
between the two countries by allowing the development of closer economic 
relations through a mutually beneficial expansion of free trade. 42 CER is a 
comprehensive free trade agreement, meaning that all goods are covered unless 
specifically excluded. A review of CER in 1988 produced the Protocol on Trade 
in Services, which provides for free trade in services between New Zealand and 
Australia. 
On 14 November 2000 ew Zealand ai1d Singapore signed CEP, wl1icb is 
also a comprehensive free trade agreement. At the time of signing Prime 
Minister Goh Cbok Tong of Singapore hailed the agreement as a milestone in 
bilateral relations.43 CEP takes a very different form from CER in a number of 
ways . There are fewer provisions governing the removal of tariffs and other 
direct baniers to trade. This is a reflection of the fact that before CEP's signing 
ew Zealand already maintained few baniers to trade in goods with Singapore. 
:is Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (2 March 1983) NZTS 
1983 no l; AustTS 1983 no 2 (CER). 
39 
Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership (14 
November 2000) NZTS 2000; SingTS 2000 (CEP). 
40 Marrakech Agreement Establis!J.ing the World Trade Organisation ( 19 December 199 3) ILM 
1144; NZTS 1994 No 17 (WTO Agreement). 
41 CER, art 2(1 ). Article 2(2) explains that New Zealand means the territory of New Zealand but 
does not include the Cook Islands. Niue and Tokelau unless the Agreement is applied to them 
under article 23. Australia means those parts of Australia to which the Agreement applies under 
article 23. Article 23 states that the Agreement shall not apply to the Cook Islands, Niue and 
Tokelau, nor to any Australian territory other than internal territories unless the Member States 
have exchanged notes agreeing the terms on which the Agreement shall apply. 
42 CER, art 1. 
43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade New Zealand and Singapore - Closer Economic 
Partnership <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/help/file/nzsincep.html> (last accessed 19 .June 2001") I. 
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Unlike the original CER, CEP contains comprehensive sections on trade m 
servjces and investment. 
In addition to assummg trading obligations on a bilateral basis with 
Australia and Singapore, New Zealand has assumed multilateral trading 
obligations to most other States under the WTO Agreements. States that accede 
to the WTO Agreement, thereby becoming WTO Members, also become parties 
to a mm1ber of other agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1947 (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services 1994 
(GATS) and the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 1994 
(TRIPS). 44 Upon becoming a WTO Member and a party to the many agreements 
for which it is responsible, a State assumes far-reaching obligations in relation to 
its trade with other WTO Members. The Most Favoured Nation and ational 
Treatment principles contained in the Agreements ensure that Member States 
afford trade concessions equally to all WTO Members, and that they treat foreign 
producers and providers the same as they treat domestic producers and 
providers. 45 New Zealand is a WTO Member, along with 141 other countries.46 
Like the obligations imposed by all international treaties, the obligations 
assmned by New Zealand under CER, CEP and the WTO Agreements are 
binding and must be canied out in good faith. 
Since they are all free trade agreements, CER, CEP and the WTO 
Agreements cover many of the same issues. Primarily, the Agreements establish 
a regime of free trade by requiring the removal of any barriers, both direct and 
indirect, to trade in goods and services .47 In addition to these requirements, the 
44 See the WTO web site for a list of the other agreements covered by the WTO Agreement: 
<http://www.wto.int> (last accessed 28 September 2001). 
45 For a more detailed discussion about the MFN and NT principles, see Michael J Trebilcock and 
Robert Howse The Regulation of International Trade (2 ed, Routledge, London, 1999) 26-29. 
46 See the WTO web site for a list of the WTO's members: <http ://www.wto.int> (last accessed 
28 September 2001). 
47 The multilateral trading regime originally consisted of the GA TI 1947. The GA IT covered 
only trade in manufactured goods, and not trade in agricultural goods or trade in services. After 
seven years of negotiation at the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations the WTO Agreen.1.ent was 
signed as the umbrella agreement covering the GAIT 1947 and various other agreements 
expanding the regime to cover trade in services, intellectual propeny, and, to a limited extent, 
agricultural goods and foreign investment. When CER was signed in J 983 it too dezilt only with 
trade in goods. Since 1983 the Australian and New Zealand Governments have reached a 
number of understandings extending the Agreement to cover trade in services. 
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Agreements contain clauses relating to rules of origin, anti-dumping and the 
ability of Member States to impose countervailing measures in reaction to 
subsidised goods impmied from other countries. 48 
Importantly, the Agreements contain exceptions to their general 
requirements, which allow Member States to implement trade restricting 
measures that would normally constitute a breach of the Agreements. Generally 
speaking, however, the scope of the exceptions is very nm-row. For example, 
article XX of the GATT states that the GATT should not be construed as 
preventing the adoption or enforcement of measures to achieve certain goals, 
which are then elaborated in the aiiicle. The goals relate to high policy, Sllch as 
protecting public morals, preventing disorder and crime, and protecting human, 
animal or plant life or health. There is also an impo1iant caveat placed upon any 
measure justified under article XX, which is that the measure must not be applied 
in a maimer that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade. Thus the aiiicle XX exceptions are 
very limited in what they allow. CER, CEP and the GATS contain a similar 
clause to article XX of the GATT. 49 In addition, tbe Agreements contain clauses 
that allow States to impose trade restrictive measures in response to durnping, 50 
subsidised goods,51 balai1ce of payments problems,52 and threats to certain 
industries. 53 Before States attempt to impose measures under these clauses they 
must prove that particular circumstances exist. \ 1merous WTO disputes pai1el 
and appellate body decisions illustrate that specific evidence must be produced 
and complicated legal tests met before the existence of such circumstances will 
be proven. 54 
48 Article 15, the anti-dumping provision, was removed from CER after New Zealand and 
Australia amended their competition laws in a manner that deals with !he problems originally 
covered by article 15. 
49 CER, art 18; CEP, art 72; General Agreement on Trade in Services ( 19 December 1993) UKTS 
58 (1996), CM3276, a.rt XIV (GATS). 
50 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (30 October 1947) 55 UNTS 187, art Vl (GAIT); 
CEP, art 9. For CER, see above, n 41. 
51 GA TT, art VI. 
52 GA TT, art XII; GATS, a1i XII; CEP, art 73. 
53 GA TT, art XIX. 
54 For example, see Canada - Measures Affecting Exporrs of Unprocessed Herring and ~·almon 
BJSD 35S (1988) 98; Thailand: Restrictions on importation of and Jntemal Tuxes on Cigaretle.1· 
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CEP does have some exceptions not found m CER or the WTO 
Agreements. Of particular importance is article 74, the Treaty of Waitangi 
clause. Under aiiicle 74, New Zealand can adopt measures inconsistent with 
CEP that it deems necessary to accord more favourable treatment to Maori, and 
to fulfill its Treaty of Waitangi obligations. Like the general exceptions, 
however, such measures caimot be used as a meai1s of arbitrary or unjustified 
discrimination against persons or Singapore itself, or as a disguised restriction on 
trade in goods, services or investment. 
. 55 d d 'd taxation measures, ai1 oes not overn e 
Finally, CEP does not apply to any 
ew Zealai1d's obligations under any 
other international, regional or bilateral agreement, such as CER and the WTO 
Agreements. 56 
The range of trade restricting measures allowable under New Zealand's 
free trade agreements is extremely nanow. The high levels of assessment and 
justification required, the prohibition on exceptions being disguised trade 
restrictions, and requirements for ensuring that exceptions restrict trade no more 
thai1 is necessary, severely restrict 1 ew Zeal and' s ability to regulate in 
contravention of its free trade agreements. 
Finally, CER, CEP and the WTO Agreements contain enforcement 
mechanisms. CER relies largely on consultations between the Parties to resolve 
ai1y disputes, but as ai1 international treaty, is subject to enforcement through 
international arbitration. 57 CEP contains a more explicit regime of dispute 
settlement, allowing the appointment of arbitral panels and recourse to the WTO 
disputes settlement procedure. 58 The WTO disputes settlement procedure relies 
in the first instai1ce on consultations between the Member States to resolve the 
dispute. If consultations fail to resolve the dispute there is a rules-based dispute 
BSID 37th Supp (1990); United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna: Report of' the Panel 
(J 994) GA TT Doc. DS29/R; Uni1ed Stares - Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products Report of'the Panel WT/D58/R (15 May 1998); United Srates - Safeguard Measures on 
imports of ji-esh. chilled or frozen lamb meat from New Zealand and Australia DS177/AB/R, 
DS178/AB/R(Ol May 2001). 
55 CEP, art 78. 
5° CEP, art 80. 
57 CER, art 22. 
58 CEP, part 10. 
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settlement procedure that can produce binding rulings which require Member 
States to take specific actions. 59 
In addition to CER, CEP and the WTO Agreements, New Zealand takes 
part in a number of other international trade organisations. The most significant 
of these is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). APEC is the 
primary vehicle in the Asia-Pacific region for promoting open trade and 
eco11omic cooperation. It is not, however, a formal trade agreement like CER, 
CEP and the WTO Agreements. Instead, leaders and officials from APEC 
Member States meet to discuss economic cooperation and set certain goals for 
free trade. In 1994, for instance, the ammal meeting of APEC Leaders in Bogor, 
Indonesia, set the "Bogor Goals" for creating the world's largest area of free 
trade and investment by 2020. This paper does not focus on APEC, for while its 
importance is not doubted, the paper is concerned with the free trade agreements 
whicb impose binding obligations. 
The following sections examine some provisions of CER, CEP and the 
WTO Agreements to show how they bind New Zealand into the system of global 
governance. lt should be noted that there may be other provisions in tl1e 
Agreements which also illustrate this point, but which are not mentioned below. 
A Direct Barriers to Trade in Goods - Prohibitions on the Use of Tar(ffs, 
Quantitative Restrictions and Subsidies 
Tariffs, subsidies and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports are 
measures imposed by governments that are considered direct barriers to trade in 
· goods. When imposed, each measure has an adverse impact upon the ability of 
producers and providers to trade freely in goods. For example, the ew Zealand 
Government may impose a tariff on Australian lamb, requiring all importers to 
pay a levy on each kilogram of Australian lamb imported. The importer will 
pass some or all of this extra cost onto the next buyer, whether a retailer or 
consumer, meaning that the price of the lamb is higher. A higher price for the 
59 GA TT, arts XXII, XXIII. Also see the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
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lamb will result in a lower quantity demanded. By lowering the quantity 
demanded and the a.mount oflamb that could be sold in New Zea.land, the tariff 
acts as a ba1Tier to the trade of lamb between New Zealand and Australia. 
Similarly, any restriction on the quantity of a product that may be imported into 
New Zealand acts as an obvious barrier to trade by reducing the amount that of 
the product that could otherwise be imported. A subsidy given to New Zealand 
producers has the potential to distort trade in two ways. First, it may give New 
Zealand producers an advai1tage in foreign markets by allowing them to undercut 
the prices of foreign producers who do not receive subsidies. Second, foreign 
expo1ters who do not receive subsidies will not be able to sell their prod1.1cts in 
New Zealand as cheaply as Tew Zealai1d producers, thereby denying them 
mai·ket access they might otherwise have if the New Zealand producers were not 
getting the benefits of the subsidy. 
Governments may choose to impose tariffs, qum1titative restrictions ai1d 
subsidies for a vai·iety of reasons . For exainple: 60 
(a) To protect domestic industry; 
(b) To protect domestic employment; 
(c) To ensure a favourable balance of trade; 
(d) To raise revenue to pay for State activity; 
(e) To advance national security interests; 
(f) To uphold health and safety stai1dards; 
(g) To uphold and encourage environmental standards. 
All the goals listed in points (a)-(g) above can be considered legitimate 
ai1d important goals for govenm1ents. Tariffs , quantitative restrictions and 
subsidies are measures available to governments to achieve those goals. They 
do, however, amount to direct baniers to trade, and so CER, CEP and the WTO 
Agreements establish comprehensive regimes prohibiting tbeir use. The 
Agreements thus deny ew Zealand's ability to choose those measures as a way 
of achieving any of the policy outcomes outlined above. 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes 1994. 
60 Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse The Regulatwn of International Trade (2 ed, 
Routledge, London, 1999) 2-11. 
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Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of CER deal with direct barriers to trade in goods 
between Australia and New Zealand. In essence, the articles provide for the 
permanent removal of direct barriers to trade in goods between the two nations . 
In 2001, there are no tariffs or quantitative restrictions on trans-Tasman trade in 
goods which meet CER origin requirements,61 and the New Zealand Government 
cannot place any new tariffs or quantitative import or expo1i restrictions on 
goods originating in Australia. 62 In addition, the New Zealand Government's 
ability to give domestic industry any expo1i subsidy, incentive or other assistance 
measure to produce goods traded with Australia is highly constrained . c,3 In 
accordance with CER, therefore, New Zealand has removed aJ1y measures that 
represent a direct banier to trade in goods with Australia, and cannot re-impose 
them. 
CEP requires 1 ew Zealand to eliminate all tariffs on goods originating in 
Singapore, and to refrain from imposing any tariffs in the futme64 New Zealand 
may not impose any quotas on goods impo1ied from Singapore or on goods 
exported to Singapore. 65 Also, there is a prohibition on all export subsidies.c,c, 
Like CER, therefore, CEP prevents the New Zealand Government from imposing 
any measures that amotmt to a direct barrier to trade in goods. 
The WTO Agreements also deal with direct baJTiers to trade in goods. 
Under the GATT, once a WTO Member State agrees to a tariff concession, it 
must adhere to it by not imposing any tariffs in excess of the concession given.
67 
In addition, the GATT contains a general prohibition on the use of quantitative 
restrictions on the import and export of goods into or out of WTO Member 
States. 68 The GATT does not provide a complete prohibition on the use of 
subsidies, but does provide that Member States should seek to avoid the use of 
61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australia: Closer Economic Relcuions 
<http: //www. miat.govt.nz/foreign/ regions/aust:raJia/cer.html> ( last accessed 19 June 2001 ). 
62 CER, arts 4(1 ), 5(1 ), 8(2). 
63 CER, art 9. 
64 CEP, art 4. 
65 CEP, a11 6. 
66 CEP, art 7. 
67 GA TI, art II. 
68 GA TI, art Xl. 
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subsidies. 69 Where any WTO Member does grant or maintain any subsidy, the 
GATT establishes ce1iain procedures geared towards the tem1ination of the 
subsidisation. 70 
Following a general preference for neo-classical economic refom1, 
successive New Zealand Governments in the 1980s and 1990s pursued an 
aggressive agenda of trade liberalisation in accordance with New Zealand's 
GATT obligations. Almost all tariffs on goods imported from other countries 
were removed, quantitative import and export restrictions were lifted, and 
subsidies ceased to be given. 71 In consequence, New Zealand is now restricted 
under the GATT from re-imposing tariffs, quantitative restrictions or subsidies in 
relation to its trade in goods with the other 141 WTO Member States. 
In sum, it is evident that New Zealand's free trade agreements prohibit 
tbe New Zealand Government from imposing tariffs and quantitative restrictions, 
or from granting subsidies to domestic producers. This denies the Government 
the opportunity to employ such measures as a means to achieve certain legitimate 
policy objectives. If sovereignty is considered the exclusive and absolute ability 
of a State to detennine its own laws within its tenitory, then the prohibition on 
the use of direct barriers to trade imposed by CER, CEP and the WTO 
Agreements ce1iainly represents a redefinition of 
sovereignty. 
ew Zealand's State 
B Indirect Barriers to Trade in Goods - the Requirements of 
Harmonisation and Recognition 
Governments may impose measures that form direct baniers to trade in 
goods. Governments can also impose measures that are not related to trade per 
se, but which still amount to trade barriers. The numerous regulations which 
governments enact to check the excesses of the market and to protect the bealth 
and safety of their citizens and the envirom11ent in which they live can restrict 
69 GA TI, art XVI. 
70 GA TI, ar1 XVI. 
24 
trade. Such regulations vary tremendously across borders and can often be 
manipulated or exploited to protect domestic industry from internatio11al 
competition. Even when there is no protectionist intent on the part of lawmakers, 
differences in regulatory or standard-setting regimes across borders can function 
to impede trade. 72 Consider the example of food labeling. In an eff01i to protect 
the health and welfare of consumers, the New Zealand Government may impose 
regulations requiring food producers to provide ce1iain inforn1ation on the 
packaging of their products before they go on sale. If New Zealand's food 
labeling regulations require that more information be included on packaging than 
is required by Australian regulations, then Australian producers may not be able 
to expo1i their goods into New Zealand. ew Zealand producers, however, who 
comply with New Zealand regulations will also comply with the more Jax 
Australian regulations, and so will be able to expo1i their product into the 
Australian market. This creates a trade distortion in favour of New Zealand. 
Other examples of indirect barriers to trade in goods include competition 
law and quarantine systems. If the competition laws in one country are 
significantly different from those foreign firms have experienced in their home 
markets, the costs of doing business may be increased and trade growth 
retarded. 73 Similarly, a quarantine system with very strict sanitary requirements 
might make it almost impossible for exporters to get their goods through 
quarantine into the foreign market. As mentioned above, regulation such as food 
labeling, competition law and quarantine systems may not be designed to be 
baiTiers to trade, but their effect is to restrict trade. As a result, CER, CEP and 
the WTO Agreements impose regimes directed towards the removal of indirect 
baniers to trade. Significantly, these regimes are lai·gely geared towards the 
harmonisation of laws or the recognition of other countries' regulatio11s ai1d 
standards. New Zealand may attempt to harmonise its Jaws with the laws of its 
trading partners in three possible v,1ays. First, it may adopt laws that are the same 
as the laws of its trading partners. Second, it can work towai·ds laws which are 
71 Paul Dalziel and Ralph Lattimore The New Zealand Macroec:onmny: A Briefing un the Reforms 
(2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1996) 31-34. 
72 Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse The Regulation of International Trade (2 ed, 
Routledge, London, 1999) 135. 
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complimentary with the laws of its trading partners in that both sets of laws are 
compatible with the objective of free trade. Third, New Zealand c311 aim to 
reduce the difference between its laws aJ1d the Jaws of its trading paiiners, 
thereby minimising but not necess31·ily eliminating trade distorting features. 
The notion of recognition involves New Zealand recogmsmg the 
regulations and standaJ·ds of its trading partners, so that matters valid in those 
countries would be recognised in New Zealand. In other words, producers from 
other countries who comply with their domestic regulations will be deerned to 
have complied with New Zealand's regulations and will be given access to ew 
Zealand's markets accordingly. 
CER recognises that countries may impose significant indirect bai.Tiers to 
trade, mainly thrnugh domestic regulation. Under CER, therefore, both New 
ZealaJ1d and Australia are required to examine the scope for taking action to 
harmonise requirements relating to such matters as standards, teclmical 
specifications and testing procedures, domestic labeling and restrictive trade 
· 74 pract1ces. ln addition, government bodies and other organisations and 
institutions should be encouraged to work towai·ds harmonisation of these 
requirements. 75 In accordance with this requirement, the Memorandum of 
Understai.1ding (MOU) Between the Government of ew Zealand and the 
Govermnent of Australia on the Harmonisation of Business Law was signed on 1 
July 1988. The MOU 1988 was replaced by the Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Government of 1ew Zealand and the Government of Australia on 
Coordination of Business Law signed on 31 August 2000. According to the 
MOU 2000, both Governments are awai·e that existing Jaws and regulatory 
practices relating to business within each economy may impede the development 
of trans-Tasman business activity, ai.1d that through increased coordination and 
dialogue both parties will endeavour to minimise such impediments?' The \10U 
2000 identifies certain areas of business law and regulatory practices as possible 
73 Gary A Hughes "Redirecting CER and the Harmonisation of Competition Law" ( 1995) 7 
Auckland University Law Review 1039. 
74 CER, art 12(1)(a). 
75 CER, art 12(1)(b). 
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candidates for coordination,77 and obliges eacb Government to take steps to 
facilitate eaTly examination of these areas for coordination. 78 In addition, each 
Government is to consult the other when it considers that a difference between 
the two countries' business laws or regulatory practices gives rise to an 
impediment to the development of the trans-Tasman relationship. 79 
Harmonisation of New Zealand and Australian laws has not occurred to 
tbe extent envisaged by the MOU 1988. In the area of corporate law for 
instance, very few of the changes signaled by the MOU have been realised. 80 
Nevertheless, some significant ham1onisation of laws has occurred. 81 The 
competition laws of both countries are now in alignment, for the Commerce Act 
1986 and the Fair Trading Act 1986 are modeled on tbe equivalent Australian 
legislation: the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 82 Similarly, New Zealand's 
consumer protection law is now in line with Australian consumer protection 
law. 83 Furthermore, in recognising that the limited reciprocal enforcement of 
each others' judgments was a hindrance to the development of closer economic 
ties, both New Zealand and Australia have amended tbeir reciprocal enforcement 
of judgments regimes to allow the enforcement of injunctions and other non-
monetary judgrnents. 84 It remains to be seen whether the speed of harmonisation 
will increase as a result of the MOU 2000. 
76 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of New Zealand and the 
Government of Australia on Coordination of Business Law 2000, understanding 3 (MOU 2000). 
77 MOU 2000, 1mderstanding 7 and aimex. 
78 MOU 2000, understanding 12. 
79 MOU 2000, understanding 10. 
80 Professor Jolm Farrar "Closer Economic Relations and Harmornsarion of Law Between 
Australia and New Zealand" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution (Brookers, 
Wellington, 1995) 158, 171. 
81 For a more complete list of the steps that have been taken by New Zealand and Australia in the 
harmonisation process see Clive Elliott "CER at the Crossroads: Business Law Harmonisation -
W11ere to Now?" [1995] NZLJ 47, 49. 
82 Gary A Hughes "Redirecting CER and the Ham1onisation of Competition Law" ( 1995) 7 
Auckland University Law Review 1039, 1041. 
83 The Fair Trading Act 1986 and the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 establish consumer 
protection law io New Zealand, and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) establishes consumer 
p,rotection Jaw in Australia. See Farrar, above, 177. 
4 David Goddard "The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments (Amendment) Act 1992: A Half 
Step Towards CER" [1992] NZ Recent LR 180. In New Zealand this was achieved by the 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments (Amendment) Act 1992. 
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While the level of hannonisation envisaged by CER has not yet occurred, 
it is clear that CER's harmonisation requirements have had a significant impact 
upon ce1iain areas of New Zealand law. In deciding to refonn certain areas of its 
law, New Zealand has looked to Australia for guidance as to the shape, nature 
and substance of the reform it should implement. Tbe significant undertakings of 
the two countries outlined in the MOU 2000 indicate that ew Zealand will be 
looking to reform more of its laws in line with Australia's laws. It is evident, 
therefore, that New Zealand is no longer free to unilaterally adopt laws that 
impinge upon its relationship with Australia. 
CEP also contains significant provisions relating to the harmonisation of 
law, policy and procedure. Under the Agreement . ew Zealand must endeavour 
to implement the APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory 
Reform. 85 These principles refer to a wide-range of areas in which New Zealand 
cunently regulates . The implication of the requirement to implement the APEC 
principles is far-reaching, for they relate to the development of competition law 
and regulatory practices that enhance economic cooperation throughout the entire 
APEC region. 86 
Part Seven of the Agreement recogmses New Zealand ' s right to 
determine its own levels of regulatory protection,87 but obliges ew Zealand to 
recognise Singapore's regulations when they align with New Zealand's. 88 
Following recognition an expo1ier who complies with Singaporean regulation 
will also meet New Zealand's regulatory requirements. In a very practical sense, 
Singapore's regulations will then apply in New Zealand. For when checking to 
see whether Singaporean goods comply with New Zealand ' s regulatory 
requirements, a legal practitioner, for example, v,,ill not look solely to New 
Zealand law, but will also check whether the goods comply with Singaporean 
85 CEP, art 3(1). 
86 See the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council Competition Policy - Aims and Findings 
<http ://pecc.org/trade/policy.htrnl> ( last accessed 6 September 200 1). The APEC region 
consists of APEC's 21 Member States: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile , P eople's 
Republic of China, Hong Kong (China), Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of K.orea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of the Philippines, Russia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Unites States of Ame1ica and Vietnam. 
87 CEP, art 44. 
88 CEP, part 7. 
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law as recognised by New Zealand. Thus recognition allows the laws of one 
State to apply within the jurisdiction of another State, and in this sense, the whole 
notion of recognition appears to run counter to the traditional notion of State 
sovereignty. It is hard to judge the effect of CEP 's recognition requirements 
upon the law of New Zealand because the Agreement has only been in force for a 
short while. It must be presumed, however, that New Zealand will strive to 
uphold its recognition obligations, thereby allowing Singaporean law to apply in 
New Zealand. 
The WTO Agreements, or more specifically the GATT, also deals with 
indirect baniers to trade in goods. The national treatment provisions found in the 
GATT obligate Member States to treat "like products" alike within the borders of 
the importing country. 89 This prevents discriminatory application of regulations 
between domestic and imported goods. In addition, any regulation imposed by a 
com1try that equally applies to both foreign and domestic products, but which 
places a disproportionately larger burden on imports, will breach article III( 1) of 
the GATT, which provides that internal regulations should not be applied to 
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production. 
A breach of article III(l) will occur whether or not the internal regulation is 
intended to protect domestic industry. Once a regulation is found to bave 
breached the GATT provisions, the State wishing to apply the regulation must 
attempt to justify it under the various exceptio11s provisions, ofte11 article XX. 
Two further agreements exist to determine what kind of regulation comes within 
article XX to be GATT consistent: the Agreement on Teclu1ical Barriers to Trade 
1994 (TBT Agreement) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures 1994 (SPS Agreement).
90 
89 GATT, art III(4). 
90 A sanitary or phytosanitary measure includes all relevant laws, decrees. regulations, 
requirements and procedures including, inter a/ia, end product cn1ena; processes and production 
methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures; quarantrne treatments 
including relevant requirements associated with t.he transport of animals or plants, or with the 
materials necessaiy for their survival dming transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, 
sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and labelling requirements 
directly related to food safety applied to (a) protect animal or plant life or health withm the 
territory of the Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, 
diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; (b) protect human o:r animal 
life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, 
toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs; ( c) protect human· life or 
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The TBT Agreement encourages WTO Members to use relevant 
international standards of regulation where they exist.
91 There 1s a nmge of 
organisations, both govenunental and non-governmental, that set international 
standards. Those mentioned in the various WTO Agreements include the 
International Organisation for Standardisation, the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, the Food and Ag1icultural 
Organisation, and the World Health Organisation. 
92 Upon adopting a regulation 
that is line with the international standards, a rebuttable presumption is created 
that the standard does not create an mmecessary obstacle to trade, tllereby 
complying with aiiicle XX. 93 Should New Zealand adopt a regulation not in 
accordance with international standards, it must in some circumstances enable 
other WTO Members and interested paiiies to comment on the proposed 
regulation.94 In addition, New Zealand must prove that tbe regulation complies 
with aiiicle XX, which, as previously mentioned, involves difficult legal tests. 
The incentive, therefore, is for New Zealand to adopt regulations that accord with 
international standards. By providing this incentive to ew Zealand, and to the 
other 141 WTO Member States, the TBT Agreement strives to promote 
international policy convergence. This may constrain ew Zealand in its ability 
to set regulations ai1d standards at levels it deems appropriate, thereby 
undermining its political sovereignty ai1d policy autonomy.'>
5 
Tbe SPS Agreement establishes a similar regime as the TBT Agreement 
111 relation to sanitary ai1d pbytosanitai·y measures (SPS measures). 1 n 
underlining the requirements of aiiicle XX of the GATT, SPS measures adopted 
by New Zealand must not arbitrai·ily or unjustifiably discriminate against 
health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases earned by animals, 
plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or (d) prevent or 
limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or spread of 
pests: see the SPS Agreement, annex 1. 
91 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1994 (19 December 1993) LJKTS 11 (1996), CM 
3044, art 2.4 (TBT Agreement). 
92 Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse The Regulation of' International Trade (2 ed, 
Routledg~Londo~ 1999) 151. 
93 TBT Agreement, art 2.5. 
94 TBT Agreement, art 2.5-2 .9. 
95 See Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse The Regulation of International Trade (2 ed, 
Routledge, London, 1999) 144. 
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Members, or be applied in a way that constitutes a disguised res1.riction on 
trade. 96 More significan1.ly, however, SPS measures must apply only to the 
extent necessary and be based on scientific principles and evidence.
97 New 
Zealand should base its SPS measures on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations wherever possible,
98 and when it does so, its measures wiJl be 
assumed to be GATT consistent.
99 Once again, the incentive is to adopt SPS 
measures in line international standards. Adopting international standards 
encomages harmonisation of laws, but in the absence of international standards 
and the possibility of han11onisation, ew Zealand is obliged to recognise the 
SPS measures of other WTO Members if they demonstrate their measures 
achieve the same purpose as New Zealand's measures.
100 ln this way the SPS 
measures of 141 other States may apply in New Zealand . Arguably, the SPS 
Agreement has greater implications for New Zealand's sovereignty than the TBT 
Agreement, for SPS measures relate to New Zealand 's food supply and 
environment, which are central to any nation's wellbeing. In prescribing how 
Tew Zealand should justify regulations pertaining to its environment and food 
supply, and that it should recognise the regulations of other countries pertaining 
to its environment and food supply, the SPS Agreement goes to the core of New 
Zealand's sovereignty. 101 
To sum up this Pa.rt, the wide-spread requirements for harmonisation and 
recognition on both a bilateral and multilateral basis have significant implications 
for the traditional notion of State sovereignty. The practical consequences of the 
requirements are a convergence of ew Zealand's laws with those of its trading 
partners, and an extension of its trading partner's laws into Tew Zealand. As 
explained in Part IT, sovereignty has always been defined as the ability of a State 
to determine its internal laws free from outside influence. The reqt1irements for 
the removal of indirect ban-iers to trade in goods clearly bring outside influences 
96 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 1994 (]9 December 
1993) UKTS 54 (1996), CM 3275, art 2.3 (SPS Agreement). 
97 SPS Agreement, art 2.2. 
98 SPS Agreement, a.rt 3 .1. 
99 SPS Agreement, art"3.2 
100 SPS Agreement, art 4.1. 
101 See Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse The Regulation of International Trade (2 ed, 
Routledge, London, 1999) 145. 
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into New Zealand's lawmaking process, and in doing so they cut across that 
definition of sovereignty. 
C Barriers to Trade in. Services - More Harmonisation and Recognition. 
Required 
Trade in services is a relatively new aspect of the world trading system. 
For example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) governing 
multilateral trade in services was only finalised in 1994 at the end of the Uruguay 
negotiations. The original CER did not contain any provisions relating to trade 
in services, but a review of CER in 1988 produced tbe Protocol on Trade in 
Services, which provided for free trade in services between ew Zealand and 
Australia. In contrast, CEP contained a detailed section on trade in services 
when signed in 2000. 102 Tradable services are many and varied, but include 
things such as legal services, financial services, architect1.1re, 
telecommunications, and building contracting. Trade in services is defined as the 
1 f · 103 supp y o a service: 
(a) from the territory of one State into the territory of another State (for example, 
insurance claims from country A may be processed in country B; the 
information and data is often transferred electronically); 
(b) in the territory of one State to the service consumer of another State (for 
example, a person in country A retains the legal services of a lawyer in 
country B); 
( c) by a service supplier of one State, through commercial presence m the 
territory of another State; 
(d) by a service supplier of one State, through presence of natural persons of a 
State in the territory of any other State. 
As with trade in goods, governments can erect barriers to trade in 
services . The natlire of the barriers, however, is quite different from the nature 
of barriers to trade in goods. Given the various modes of service delivery just 
outlined, most barriers to trade in services will take tl1e form of domestic 
102 CEP, part 5. 
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regulation. Quality regulation, for instance, such as requirements for training and 
certification of professionals that allow for limited recognition of foreign 
credentials, will prevent foreign service providers from entering a domestic 
market. Similarly, inunigration policy denying temponu-y entry of foreign 
service providers may impose barriers to trade. Therefore, as with indirect 
barriers to trade in goods, the means of removing baniers to trade in services is 
for nations to work towards harmonisation of domestic regulation ;md/or 
recognition of each others' regulation. Thus, the ultimate implications for 
domestic policy sovereignty of free trade in services may be profound. 
As mentioned above, the mam instrument govemrng trade in services 
between Australia and ew Zealand is the CER Protocol on Trade in Services 
1988.104 Upon signing the Protocol, each government agreed to treat the 
providers of services from the other country on the same basis as its own service 
providers, and looked to harmonise a range of non-tariff measures such as 
customs issues, standards, and business law. In accordance with the Protocol, 
and on a reciprocal basis with Australia, New Zealand passed the Trans-Tasman 
Mutual Recognition Act 1997 (TTRMA). The Long Title of the TTRMA states 
that it is an Act to provide for the recognition in New Zealand of regulatory 
standards adopted in Australia regarding goods and occupations. fn effect, the 
Act allows anyone occupationally registered in an Australian jurisdiction to 
register for and carry out the equivalent occupation in New Zealand without 
satisfying any farther requirements.
105 When the TTRMA is coupled with 
corporate and competition laws that allow New Zealand and Australian 
companies to trade equally in both colmtries, and with laws permitting tbe free 
movement of people between the t\vo countries, then it is possible to conceive 
service delivery in the two countries as virtually occuning within a common 
market. In a very real sense, therefore, CER has bound New Zealand's economy 
to Australia's. The laws New Zealand passes, and conversely the laws Australia 
passes, will have a direct impact upon the economies and markets of the other. 
In other words, neither border is impervious to the actions of another State. 
103 GATS, art 1. See also Trebilcock and Howse, above, 273. 
104 Protocol on Trade in Services to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement (1 January 1989) NZTS 1988 no 30; AustTS 1988 no 20. 
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There is no c1earer illustration of a redefinition of State sovereignty as outlined in 
Part II(A). 
The regimes for free trade in services established by CEP and the GATS 
have not been as pervasive in New Zealand as the requirements of CER. They 
have the potential to be extremely fai--reaching, however, by integrating New 
Zealand's services market with the services markets of Singapore and the other 
VITO Member States. The key provision of the GATS is the national treatment 
provision, under which quality regulation, qualification requirements, registration 
requirements, establishment conditions and other such regulation caimot be more 
burdensome for foreign service providers thai1 for domestic service providers.
106 
In essence, this provision achieves the san1e outcome as produced by the 
TTMRA in relation to trade in services with Australia, but it relates to all other 
WTO Members. 107 
In addition to the national treatment provisions of the GA TS, there are 
other provisions of the Agreement which may one day circumscribe New 
Zealand's ability to regulate as it pleases. Of pai·ticul ar note are th recognition 
requirements. New Zealai1d may recognise the regulations of one WTO 
Member, and once it has done so, it must afford all other WTO Members tll e 
oppo1iunity to show that their domestic regulation is also worthy of 
recognition. 108 In the long nm, this variant on the Ylost Favoured ations 
principle has the potential to result in the regulations of almost every other 
countiy in the world being recognised as valid in New Zealand. Or to put it 
ai1other way, the laws made by almost every other country will app ly in New 
Zealand. This seems a far cry from the position that no State has the ability to 
interfere with the domestic affairs of another State. 
As already mentioned, the GATS has not had the equivalent deep impact 
of the CER trade in services requirements. eve1iheless, the GATS regime 
105 Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997, ss 14, 15 , 16. 
106 GATS, art XVII. 
107 It should be noted that unlike CER the GATS does allow members to make specific 
reservations to the national u-eatment requirements in relation to particular service sectors: see the 
GATS, an XVII(l). 
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represents a redefinition of New Zealand's sovereignty m that it already 
circumscribes how New Zealand can regulate it services sector, but more 
significantly, it heralds the potential for the actions of other nations to impact 
upon the domestic affairs of New Zealand. 
The provisions of CEP dealing with trade in services look like a blend of 
the CER and GATS provisions. 109 CEP thus provides a further illustration of 
how New Zealand's sovereignty has been redefined as a result of signing a free 
trade agreement. 
D The WTO Disputes Settlement Procedure - New Zealand Overruled 
If a WTO Member considers that any trading benefit accruing to it 
directly or indirectly lmder the WTO Agreements is being "nullified or impaired" 
by a policy or practice of another Member, the complaining Member can refer its 
complaint to the General Council of the WTO acting as the Disputes Settlement 
Body (DSB). The DSB will appoint a panel to investigate the complaint and 
make recommendations to tbe WTO Council for resolution of the dispute. 110 
Any member may appeal a panel's decision on a matter of law to a standing 
appellate body. If the Council adopts the recommendations of a panel or 
appellate body, a member is required to modify or withdraw its policy or practice 
to bring itself into conformity with the Council's decision. Tf it fai ls to do so, the 
Council can authorise retaliatory action by the aggrieved Member in the form of 
a suspension of trade concessions or other obligations. There has been a high 
1. . l 1 d . 111 comp iance rate wit 1 pane recommen at10ns. 
There have been some high profile disputes resolved through the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure that have highlighted tbe potential effect of the 
WTO Agreements on a nation's domestic sovereignty. Jn the Tuna/Dolphin 1 
108 GATS, art VlI(2). 
109 CEP, pati 5. 
110 GAT'T, a1i XXlil. This article is now substantially elaborated in the WTO Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ( 13 December 1993) UKTS l 0 
( 1996), CM 3046. 
111 Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse The Regulation of International Tmde (2 ed, 
Routledge, London, 1999) 37. 
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case, 
112 
the United States of America placed an embargo on the import of tuna 
from Mexico because Mexico had failed to satisfy the United States' authorities 
that its tuna was caught in a mam1er that did not risk the destruction of dolphins. 
Mexico complained that the embargo violated aiiicle XI of the GATT, which 
prohibits quai1titative restrictions on imports . The United States relied on the 
GATT exceptions in aiiicle XX to justify the embargo, saying that it was to 
protect the life and health of dolphins, ai1d that it related to the conservation of 
dolphins as an exhaustible natmal resource. In other words, the embargo was a 
measure designed to achieve a paiiicular environmental outcome. The Panel 
fow1d that the article XX exceptions did not apply, and that the United States 
embargo therefore constituted a breach of its GATT obligations. 113 The United 
States was required modify or withdraw its embargo. Similarly, in the 
Reformulated Gasoline Case, 114 the United States passed environmental 
legislation stipulating that conventional and reformulated gasoline sold in the 
United States must confonn to a minimum level of cleanliness. The legislation's 
goal was to ensure cleai1er air in the United States. To achieve this goal, the 
legislation regulated domestic and foreign producers of gasoline differently. 
Brazil and Venezuela, who were exporters of conventional and refonnulated 
gasoline to the United States, challenged the United States legislation under 
article III( 4) of GATT, which requires members to treat foreign producers the 
same as domestic producers. Again the United States relied on the article XX 
exceptions to justify its legislation. Both the Panel and Appellate Body found 
that article XX did not apply, that the United States legislation constituted a 
breach of its GA.TT obligations, and that it had to modify or withdraw its 
contravening legislation. 1 15 
What these WTO Panel ai1d Appellate Body decisions show is that ew 
Zealand is potentially restrained from imposing regulation designed to achieve 
legitimate policy aims if the regulation conflicts with its WTO obligations. ew 
Zealand is currently facing this very issue in relation to local content on 
112 United States - Resn·ictions on the Import a/Tuna (1991) 30 ILM 1594. 
113 For a full discussion of the Panel's reasoning see Trebilcock and Howse, above, 406-410. 
114 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS2/R (29 January 1996). 
115 For a full discussion of the Panel's reasoning see Trebilcock and Howse, above , 413-416 . . 
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commercial radio stations. The Minister of Broadcasting, Hon Marian Hobbs 
MP (the Minister), has indicated her willingness to impose mandatory local 
content quotas on commercial radio stations if they fail to implement a system of 
self-regulation resulting in greater ai1iime for New Zealand music. 116 Advice to 
the Minister is that a mandatory quota would be inconsistent with New Zealand's 
obligations under articles XVI and XVII of the GA TS, which require New 
Zealand to treat foreign service providers no less favourably that domestic 
service providers, and prevent New Zealand from placing limitations on the total 
quantity of service output in tbe form of quotas. 
117 If the Minister insists on 
implementing the local content policy, it is likely that another WTO Member, 
most likely the United States, will register a dispute with the WTO. 
1 18 Sl1ould 
New Zealand then fail to amount a successful defence of the mandatory quota, a 
dispute panel may rule against ew Zealand and require it to withdraw or 
redesign the mandatory quota to bring New Zealand into confom1ity with its 
GATS obligations. Failure to do so could result in retaliatory action by the 
Member(s) which had initiated the dispute. Of course this is not to say ew 
Zealand caimot regulate to achieve the aim of the local content policy. 
119 What 
is clear, however, is that New Zealand cannot regulate in a manner that is 
inconsistent with its GATS obligations . In the immediate instance, this means 
the Minister of Broadcasting caimot implement the mode of regulation she 
prefers. More pervasively, if there is no oilier meai1s available to achieve the 
goal of the local content quota, it means the Minister caimot regulate to achieve 
her desired goal at all. 
Quite obviously, New Zealai1d's lawmaking autonomy has to an extent 
been circumscribed by its accession to the WTO Agreements. This raises an 
important question about New Zealand's ability to regulate in the future for 
116 Office of the Minister for Trade Negotiations "Local Content m Broadcasting: New Zealand ·s 
International Obligations" (September 2001) para 2. 
117 Office of the Minister for Trade Negotiations "Local Content in Broadcasting: New Zealand's 
International Obligations" (September 2001) paras 10-13. 
118 The United States has already put New Zealand "on notice" on this issue 111 its 2001 USTR 
National Trade Estimate Report of Foreign Trade BaITiers. See Office of the M mister for Trade 
Negotiations "Local Content in Broadcasting: New Zealand's International Obligations" 
(September 2001) para 19. 
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matters cunently unforeseen. An issue that is currently high on New Zealand's 
political agenda is that of genetic modification of organisms, which was not a 
major issue when New Zealcmd signed the WTO Agreements. There is now 
significant public supp01i for a complete ban on all genetically modified 
organisms in New Zealand. 120 Any law that prohibits the impo1i of genetically 
modified organisms could potentially conflict with the GATT provisions 
prohibiting quantitative restriction on imports. For instance, a complete ban 
would obviously restrict the importation of seeds or plants that have been 
genetically modified. A complete ban may also prevent the import of a brand of 
muesli that contains genetically modified oats.
121 In both instances, an affected 
Member may have a case before a WTO disputes panel that New Zealand's law 
banning all genetically modified organisms nullifies or impairs the benefits 
accruing to it lmder the GATT. It would then be incumbent upon New Zealand 
to justify the ban under the article XX exceptions, which apply narrowly. If the 
law restricted trade more than is necessary to achieve the aim of the law (as 
decided by the WTO panel), if it was not based upon proper scientific principles 
and evidence (also as decided by the WTO panel), and if it is not based on 
international standards, it is very likely that the WTO panel would rule against 
New Zealand and require it to repeal or modify the ban. 
Daniel Tarullo considers that the WTO Agreements increasingly address 
domestic laws, policies and practices, thereby bluning the distinction between 
domestic and international economic law and policy. In particular, he contends 
that the blur occurs when the Agreements deem domestic interventions to be new 
brands of non-tariff baniers to trade.
122 This blur is panicularly significant in 
light of the adjudicatory governance mechanism used by the WTO, which rules 
119 Local content helps to create a unified and tolerant society in which citizens have su-ong 
national identity and clear values. See Office of the Minister of Broadcasting "Broadcasting 
Policy: Objectives and Delivery Mechanisms" (06 July 2000) paras 17-2 J . 
120 10,000 people recently marched up Queen Street in Auckland to protest against genetic 
modification. See Robyn McLean "Beast is Unleashed - But What ' ow?" (2 September 2001) 
Sunday Siar Times Auckland 2. 
121 Of course the GA TT does not apply to most agricultural goods, and the Agreement on 
Agriculture 1994 does not implement a comprehensive free trade regime surrounding free trade 
in agricultural goods. This example is meant as a hypothetical, however, to indicate the potential 
impact of New Zealand's WTO obligations on_ ew Zealand's ability to regulate. 
122 Daniel K Tarullo "Law and Governance in a Global Economy" ( 1999) 93 ASIL Proceedings 
105, 106. 
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explicitly 011 domestic regulatory law and practice with an expectation that 
Member States will change their domestic Jaw in order to conform with the WTO 
ruling. Michael Ha.ii is of the view that in effect each WTO Member has agreed 
to the superior claim of their WTO obligations over domestic law.
123 He says 
that even a cursory examination of WTO Agreements suggests that govenn11ents 
have now agreed to a consequential degree of potential intervention in their 
internal affairs by other member governments through the dispute settlement 
procedures. 124 This provides a stark depiction of how New Zealand has bound 
itself into the system of global economic governance a11d, in doing so, allowed 
organisations from outside New Zealand to have considerable say over what laws 
it may implement. 
E Institutions - the Changing Structure and Function of New Zealand's 
Governmental Institutions 
The harmonisation requirements of CER, CEP and tbe WTO Agreements 
outlined in subpaiis B and C above not only have implications for New Zealand 
law and regulation, but also New Zealand's govenm1ental institutions. For 
exai11ple, in accordance with CER's requirement of harn1onising business law 
and regulatory practices, 125 New Zealand and Australia signed the 1995 
Agreement Establishing a System for the Development of Joint Food 
Standards. 126 This was the first trans-Tasman agreement to create a single 
regulatory agency, the Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA).
127 
ANZF A develops and maintains joint food stai1dards for both Australia and ew 
Zealand. Both countries are represented at all levels of the standards setting 
process, including the Board of ANZFA ai1d on the Ministerial Australia New 
Zealand Food Standards Council.
128 ANZFA is a significant step towai·ds 
123 Michael Hart "The WTO and the Political Economy of Globalisation" (1999) 33 Journal of 
World Trade 75, 84 . 
124 Hart, above, 86. 
125 CER, art 12. 
126 Agreement Establishing a System for the Development of Joint Food Standards (5 December 
1995) NZTS 1996 no 9; AustTS 1996 no 12. 
127 The Agreement entered into force on 5 July 1996 following the passage of legislation in both 
New Zealand and Australian Federal and State Governments. 
128 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australia: Agreement Between the CoVl!rmnent of N<'w 
Zealand and the Government of Ausrralia Establishing a Sysrem for the Development CJ/)oint 
39 
creating a single food market between Australia and New Zealand, and means 
that in a very real sense the New Zealand Govenunent no longer sets food 
standards unilaterally. It must cooperate with nine other jurisdictions when 
doing so - the Australian Commonwealth Government and the eight Australian 
State/Tenitory Govermnents that are a Paiiy to the Agreement. 
The New Zealand Department of Customs is especially affected by New 
Zealai1d's free trade agreements . CER provides that New Zealai1d and Australia 
will consult each other to determine any harmonisation of customs policies and 
procedures appropriate to promote the objectives of the Agreement 129 Under 
CEP, the customs administrations of New Zealand and Singapore are to work 
together to simplify customs procedures. 130 While these requirements may not 
expressly bind New Zealand to particular policies and practices relating to 
customs, they do illustrate that the New Zealand Government is no longer free to 
determine customs policy and practice on a completely rn1ilateral basis. 
The Agreements encourage other governmental bodies to cooperate to aid 
the free flow of goods and services between New Zealand and its trading 
partners. This has had practical effect. For instance, there is close cooperation 
between the New Zealand Securities Co1mnission and Commerce Conunission, 
and the Australian Securities Commission ai1d Australian Trade Practices 
Conunission. The New Zealand Securities Amendment Act 1988 contained 
provision to facilitate such assistance. 131 
Ham1onisation requirements can therefore be seen as not only having 
implications for the substantive content of New Zealand law, but also tbe 
strncture and function of New Zealand's governmental and standard-setting 
institutions. How a country chooses to arrange its internal institutions which set 
and enforce its law must surely be considered an integral part of traditional State 
Food Standards <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/regions/austra!ta/food.html> (last accessed 19 
June 2001) I. 
129 CER, art 21. 
13° CEP, art 11. 
131 Professor Jolrn Farrar "Closer Economic Relations and Harmonisation of Law Between 
Australia and New Zealand" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the Cons1ituno11 (Brookers, 
Wellington, 1995) 158, 177. 
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sovereignty. Therefore, any agreement that imposes an obligation upon a State 
to structure is governmental institutions in a particular way, and whi eh governs 
the very function of that institution, ce1iainly represents a redefinition of State 
sovereignty. 
F Transparency and Consultation - How Other Countries Can Influence 
New Zealand's Choice of Law, Regulation and Policy 
CER provides for ongomg consultation and review, including the 
consideration of whether there is need for changes in either the New Zealand or 
Australian government policies and practices in fields such as taxation, company 
law, standards, foreign investment, movement of people, tourism and 
transport. 132 Under CEP ew Zealand is required to promptly publish all Jaws, 
rules, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrati ve rulings and guidelines 
pe1iaining to trade. 133 In addition, New Zealand must provide opportunity for 
comment by Singapore on its proposed laws, rules, regulations and procedures 
affecting trade if it is of the view that they are likely to affect the rights and 
obligations of either Party under the Agreement. 134 There are similar provisions 
in the various WTO Agreements relating to all WTO Member States. 135 ln 
effect, these provisions authorise formal input into New Zealand lawmaking 
from sources outside New Zealand. 
G Future Developments 
J Additional agreements for free trade in goods and services 
In April 2001, the Rt Hon Helen Clark MP, Prime Minister of Tew 
Zealand, announced that New Zealand and the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region had agreed to commence negotiations on a closer 
economic partnership agreement. The Agreement's aims are likely to be similar 
to those of CEP with Singapore, expecting to boost two-way trade in goods and 
132 CER, art 22 . 
133 CEP, art 69( l). 
134 CEP, art 69(2) . 
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services and to increase investment. 136 There have also been indications from the 
New Zealand Govenunent that free trade negotiations may begin with the United 
States,
137 
Thailand, South Korea, Chile, and that CER may be Jinked to the 
Association of Southeast Asian ations' free trade area. 138 Given the trade 
liberalising agenda of the cuuent Government, these agreements will almost 
certainly have provisions tbat nm as deep as tbe provisions contained in CER, 
CEP and possibly the WTO Agreements. 
2 Trade in investment 
As is outlined in the following part, capital investment flows are a very 
important paii of the world's economy. Moreover, the regulation, or 
deregulation as the case may be, of foreign investment can go to the heart of 
State sovereignty. 139 CER and CEP establish bilateral regimes for free trade in 
investment, and one of the WTO Agreements, the Agreement on Trade Related 
Investment Measures 1994 (TRIMs), contains limited provisions relating to 
multilateral trade in investment. Towards the end of the 1990s, States e11tered 
into negotiations over the Multilateral Investment 011 Trade (MAI), wbich if 
signed, would have been a comprehensive agreement about multilateral free 
trade in investment. The negotiations foundered, however, largely in the face of 
concerns that the MAI would subject States to the dictates of multinational firms. 
Nevertheless, the desire to sign a detailed agreement on free trade in investment 
has not disappeared, and the issue is likely to remain on the global economic 
agenda. 140 Such an agreement has the potential to strengthen the world's system 
of global governance with significant implications for State sovereignty. 
135 GA TT, mi X; GA TS, a1i III. 
136 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade New Zealand and Singapore to Star1 Negoriaflons 
<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/speech/sministy.htrnl> (last accessed 19 June 2001) 1. 
137 The New Zealand Govenm1ent "Proposed United States Trade Agreement Lavv Welcomed" 
(29 May 2001) Press Release, 1. 
138 Hon Jim Sutton MP "Minister Spells Out Trade Policy Prillciples" (27 June 2001) Press 
Release, 1. 
139 For a discussion about the implications of foreign investment on State sovereignty see Michael 
J Trebilcock and Robert Howse The Regulation of lnternationcd Trade (2 ed, Routledge, London, 
1999) 342-347. 
140 Trebilcock and Howse, above, 362-365. 
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Rather than dealing with trade in investment and its impact upon State 
sovereignty in this section, this paper deals with the issue in Part IV within the 
context of political realities. For completeness, however, it should noted that 
there are provisions establishing trade in investment in CER, CEP and to a 
limited extent, the WTO Agreements. 
I-! Summary 
Taken together, New Zealand's free trade agreements illustrate how ew 
Zealand has bound itself into the system of global economic governance, and 
how in doing so, it arguably no longer retains the rights traditionally ascribed to a 
sovereign nation. Recalling those 1ights from Part II, the Agreements lay out 
very clearly that some intervention in New Zealand's domestic affairs is now 
permissible. The WTO in particular has the power to constrain the regulation 
New Zealand can impose. Also, while New Zeala11d's territorial integrity may 
still be inviolable, its political independence is arguably no longer so. Under 
CER, for instance, the ew Zealand Govenm1ent cannot make decisions without 
first considering their impact on Australia. Should a decision have an adverse 
impact upon Australia, undoubtedly the Australian Govenm1ent would place 
considerable pressure on the New Zealand Government to make an alternative 
decision. Moreover, all the Agreements give other countries the opportunity to 
co1m11ent on the laws and regulations ew Zealand is considering, and to 
influence the ultimate decision. The third principle of traditional State 
sovereignty - that ew Zealand is equal to all other States - appears to ren1ai11 in 
tact in spite of New Zealand's free trade agreements. Of course the reality of the 
world economic system is that some countries wield much greater power tl1an 
others. Therefore, within the interconnected web of global governance, perhaps 
New Zealand is not really equal to other States. 
The implications of ew Zeala11d's free trade agreements appear to point 
unequivocally to the fact that New Zealand's domestic sovereignty has been 
redefined, a11d that New Zealand has surrendered aspects of it in the name of 
global economic cooperation. On the other hand, CER, CEP and the WTO 
Acrreements are all international treaties the New Zealand Executive has chosen 
b 
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to sign. Likewise, lmder pure constitutional theory the New Zealand 
Government could choose to tenninate them at any time, along with any other 
treaty that purports to bind New Zealand into the system of global governance. 
In taking such action New Zealand could essentially withdraw from the growing 
web of global governance and regain any measure of State sovereignty it might 
have lost. While the co1Tectness of such pure constitutional theory cam1ot be 
denied in principle, it fails to take into account the realities of the world's 
political economy, which arguably lock-in the new system of global governance 
as the way of the future. The next pari of this paper considers these realities, and 
the fact that they lock New Zealand into its free trade agreements, as the final 
plank in the argument that New Zealar1d no longer enjoys the traditional notion 
of State sovereignty. 
IV HOW THE REALITIES OF THE WORLD'S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
CONFIRM GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AS THE WAY OF THE 
FUTURE 
The global economy is made up of markets in goods, services, finance 
and investment, and economic activity tmdertaken by firms that are establisl1ed in 
one te1Titory but operate in another. The global mar·ket is not a new 
phenomenon, but is now at unprecedented size. In 1997, the volume of 
international trade was fourteen times greater than in 1945, 14 1 and capital 
transfers exceeded a trillion dollars a day. 142 States themselves are actors within 
the global economy. They participate directly in markets, often tlu·ough State 
trading entities, as buyers, sellers ar1d investors, ar1d they create and oversee the 
legal regimes in which the markets flmction. Clearly, however, the major 
participant in the global economy is private enterprise. In particular, 
trar1snational corporations span national borders to conduct their business in all 
parts of the globe. 
141 Trebilcock and Howse, above, 22. 
142 Oscar Schachter "The Erosion of State Authority and its Implications for Equitable 
Development" in Friedl Wiess, Erik Denters and Paul de Want (eds) lnrernational Economic 
law with a Human Face (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998) 31, 32. 
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For most of this century, maJor corporations have shopped around for 
legal environments that are the most conducive to profitable enterprise. 143 
Generally speaking, busi11esses prefer to invest their capital in deregulated 
markets where there are few barriers to how they can invest, and few restrictions 
on what they can do with their profits. Since investment and capital is the engine 
of development, pressure has come onto States to deregulate their maTkets in a 
mmmer that attracts and retains capital. More significm1t are new tecm1ologies 
allow corporations to move their capital in m1d out of cotmtries at the push of a 
button. This has two important implications. First, m1y regulation a State might 
want to implement to control investment and capital is simply ineffective. The 
State's power has dwindled over cunencies, interest rates, trade flows, rates of 
unemployment and foreign investment. Exchm1ge controls, for example, have 
become almost impossible to apply, for the finance capital that can be mobilised 
in cunency markets exceeds what any govermnent can put up against it. In other 
words, while governments can still implement economic policies such as fixing 
interest rates m1d controlling the volume of cunency, they are subject to the 
discipline of the market. 144 
Second, States will refrain from imposing regulation that might deter 
capital investment because of the consequential effects on its domestic business 
and national economy. A govermnent's domestic economic policy must to a 
large degree be compatible with the regional m1d global movements of capital. 
Otherwise that government risks a nm on its cmTency, the outflow of capital to 
safer havens m1d the loss of private investment. 145 Such occmTences adversely 
affect a nation's employment rate and tax base, and its ability to pay for 
expensive social policies. 
143 Jane Kelsey ''Globalisation, State and Law: Towards a 'Multi-PerspectivaJ Polity'" in 
Australasian Law Teachers' Association Cross Currents: lnternationnhsm, Nationnl ldentrty and 
Law (Australasian Law Teachers' Association, 1995) <http://www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 
10 September 2001) 2. 
144 Oscar Schachter "The Decline of the Nation-State and its lmplications for lnterna t1onal Law" 
(1997) 36 Colombia Journal of Transnational Law 7, 10. . 
145 David Held Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance (Stanford University Press, Stanford (Cal), 1995) 13 l. 
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In the area of trade, nations must free up their trading systems in order to 
attract vital investment a11d fmance capital. 146 Private enterprise now expects to 
operate withi.11 dereb0 ulated markets with free trade in croods services and 
b ' 
investment. New Zealand has created such markets tlu·ough signing CER, CEP 
ai1d the WTO Agreements, ai1d any movement away from this position will cause 
private investment to flee New Zealai1d's shores. Given that New Zealand's low 
level of domestic savings makes it very dependent on foreign investment, 147 it is 
evident that New Zealand's free trade agreements are now crucial to New 
Zealai1d's economic prosperity. Thus any argument that New Zealand could use 
its sovereign right of unilateral withdrawal to tem1inate its free trade agreements 
is fatuous and ignores the stai·k realities of the world 's political economy. 
V CONCLUSION 
As a sovereign State New Zealand has traditionally had absolute ai1d 
exclusive control over its domestic affairs. No other State or orgai1isation has 
been entitled to interfere with New Zealand's internal lawmaking. The forces of 
globalisation have changed this traditional notion of State sovereignty. ln the 
face of problems that cross borders, the freer movement of people, goods, and 
services, and technology that allows instantaneous communication and 
movement of capital, the ability of States to regulate without being influenced by 
the wider world is diminished. In addition, non-State actors sucb as t:ra.ns-
national corporations and non-governmental bodies now wield considerable 
power ai1d influence, sometimes over ai1d above the power of States. In respo11se 
to the forces of globalisation, or are a result of those forces, a new system of 
global governance has emerged. States have bound themselves into a web of 
governai1ce agreements and organisations covering a vast array of areas. One 
extremely importai1t ai·ea in which nation-states are becomi11g increasingly 
interconnected is in relation to their economies. 1n pa1iicular the complex and 
pervasive system of global free trade in goods, services and investment has 
bound nations' economies more closely than ever before. 
146 Schachter, above, 9. 
147 Paul Dalziel and Ralph Lattimore The New Zealand Mocroeccmomy: A Briefing on rhe 
Reforms (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1996) 35. 
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New Zealand's place within this web of global economic governance is 
largely defined by its three free trade agreements, CER, CEP and the WTO 
Agreements. All three of these Agreements a.re directed towards loose 
integration of national economies. They do not create supra.national 
organisations, such as the European Union, which have the power to enforce 
laws and regulations over Member States. They do, however, impose substantive 
restrictions on the kinds of laws and policies New Zealand can impose 
domestically. More pervasively, the Agreements impose wide-ranging 
ha.nnonisa.tion and recognition requirements that obligate the ew Zealand 
Government to adopt certain laws in accordance with international standards and 
the standards of its trading partners. Failure to do so can result in the initiation of 
the WTO disputes settlement procedure, which can in turn result in a requirement 
for withdraw or an1ends its own regulation. In otber words, New Zealand's 
ability to detem1ine its own domestic regulation is circumscribed by its free trade 
agreements. In addition, the Agreements give other States formal input into " ew 
Zealand's lawmaking, and belp determine the very structure and function of 
some of New Zea.land's governmental institutions. 
New Zealand's free trade agreements thus provide a graphic ilh1stration 
of New Zealand's sovereignty redefined in an interconnected world. The 
economic and political realities of the world's economic system effectively 
prohibit New Zealand from tenninating its free trade agreements to regain any 
sovereignty it may have surrendered. Global governance has, therefore, 
supplanted State sovereignty as the ultimate organisational principle at the 
international level. Power is no longer located solely within the State, but is 
dispersed among a variety of different actors, many of whom are beyond a 
State's national borders. 
So it may be said that traditional State sovereignty has had its time, and 
that the world is now moving into an era of global governance where borders and 
boundaries a.re largely irrelevant. The immensity of the forces driving 
globalisation tend to give the whole process an air of inevitability: that the world 
is destined to become a global neighbourhood regardless of wbetl1er we like the 
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idea or not. Surely it is wo1ih reflecting on this, however, and actually 
considering whether the redefinition of State sovereignty to make room for the 
new web of global governance is a good thing or not. 
There are some who malign globalisation, paiiicuJarly its economic 
aspects, for they see it as perpetuating a free-market ideology that is aimed at 
designing society for the benefit of the economically powerful. 148
 Kelsey, for 
instance, points to the ascendancy of finance capital a11d trans-national enterprise, 
and the interdependence of the domestic and international spheres, as impinging 
upon national sovereignty by allowing only the neo-classical form of economic 
management. She insists that any attempt by a State to nationalise, restrict the 
movements of capital, renege on the bindings in the WTO, significantly increase 
taxes, re-regulate the Jabour market, or require a balance of economic, social and 
enviromnental goals would invite a devastating backlash that wolild deter any 
governments from changing tack. This, she says, has serious implications for 
social justice and self-detennination. 
149 
Others, however, point to the new system of economic integration and 
interdependence as heralding better living standards for all the world's 
population. 150 Dr Roderick Deane insists that outward looking domestic policies 
enhance economic growth, and that rather than being an ideology or a plan, 
globalisation is simply what happens when governments loosen controls and 
allow people and businesses to make their own decisions. ew Zealand's 
success, he says, depends upon economic success at the global level. 
151 
148 For example, Jane Kelsey Reclaiming the Future: New Zealand and rhe Global Economy 
(Bridget Williams Books, Wellington 1999). Also see <http://www.citizen.org> (last accessed 28 
September 2001) and <www.policyalternatives.ca> (last accessed 28 Seprember 200 l) for a list 
of publications outlining the negative aspects of economic globalisation. 
149 Jane Kelsey "Globalisation, State and Law: Towards a 'Muhi-Perspecuval Polity '" in 
Australasian Law Teachers' Association Cross Currents: lnternarionalism. National Identity and 
Law (Australasian Law Teachers' Association, 1995) <http://www.austhi.edu.au> (last accessed 
10 September 2001) 4-5. 
150 See the web sites of the WTO, IMF and World Bank for information and publications 
outlining the positive aspects of economic globalisation: <hrrp://www wto.int> (last accessed 28 
September 2001); <http://www.imf.org> (last accessed 28 September 2001); 
<http://www.worldbank.org> (last accessed 28 September 2001). 
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In the end, then, perhaps the real test for whether global governa11ce 
should replace State sovereignty as a11 organising principle will be whether it ca11 
deliver better living standm-ds, better enviromnental outcomes, and greater peace 
and security for a majority of the world's popula6on. As already indicated, it is 
not possible within the scope of this paper to make any substantial conclusions as 
to whether this has happened, whether it is happening, or whether it is likely to 
happen. 
What I am able to say, however, is that it seems impossible to refute that 
t11e world is inherently a more global place now than ever before, and that it will 
continue to globalise. The use individuals and finns make of new technology 
will continue to break-down borders whether nations and governments like it or 
not. Furthermore, there are se1ious global problems that can only be addressed 
realistically on a multilateral basis. There is also evidence to suggest that 
economic integration arrangements, such as the European Union, lead to peace 
and security in the long-terrn.
152 H makes sense on a conceptual level tllat people 
will not fight those with whom their own wellbeing is interwoven. It is this last 
point that leads me to the conclusion that the passing of State sovereignty as the 
ultimate organising principle is not necessarily a bad thing, and that some form 
of global governance should be welcomed. For global governance appears to 
herald tbe possibility of a world that is united against common problems and 
focussed on bettering the lives of all its inhabitants. 
This is not to say that the current model of global governance should be 
embraced. At present the model displays serious flaws that deserve careful 
scrutiny. As already seen, the political realities sunounding global economic 
governance arguably prevent the State from instituting policies that are 
"business-unfriendly", even though they may benefit people in need. Power, it 
could be said, is located in the hands of the powerful at the expense of tl1e less 
powerful. There is, therefore, perhaps greater scope for the world's system of 
151 Roderick Deane "Globalisation and Constitutional Development" in Colin James (ed) 
Building the Constitution (Victoria University of Wellington Institute of Policy Studies, 
Wellington, 2000) 112. . 
152 Martin J Dedman The Origins and Development of the Europe(ln Union 1945-95: A History of 
European Integration (Routledge, London, 1996) 8-15. 
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global governance to balance social and environmental goals with economic 
concen1s . 
In addition, the key economic and political agents participating in the new 
regime of global governance, such as the WTO, are not democratic in the sense 
that individuals do not have a direct say in their direction and function. This is 
problematic when those organisations purpmi to regulate the lives of those 
individuals . As a finiher consequence of this lack of democracy, there is little if 
any direct accountability from international organisations back to individuals. 
While it seems difficult to address this without establishing structures like the 
European Parliament, the members of which are directly elected by the people of 
Europe, there is perhaps more that can occur at the national level to ensure a 
higher level of participation in the system of global governance. Taking New 
Zealand as the example, tbe Government could certainly attempt to involve its 
citizens more when negotiating and ratifying international treaties with 
implications for sovereignty. The recent changes that aJlow Parliament to vote 
on whether the Executive should ratify an international treaty does introduce 
more transparency into the process. It is fairly peace-meal reforn1, however, 
because the Executive reqt1ires no Parliamentary mandate before it begins 
negotiations, Parliament cannot impose any constraints on the Executive in 
relation to negotiations, Parliament only sees the text of the treaty once 
negotiated and finalised, and Parliament only votes to take or leave the treaty, 
rather than endorsing certain parts but rejecting others. 153 There is, tberefore, 
very limited ability for Parliament and individuals to inil uence international 
treaty making. In response, Bill Mansfield suggests that ew Zealand formalise 
certain processes to ensure that Maori, the business conm1tmity, NGOs and other 
community interests are: 
(a) made aware of matters that are to become the subject of negotiations; 
(b) have the opportunity to contribute to the development of a negotiating brief; 
153 Jane Kelsey Reclaiming the Future: New Zealand and the Glol5nl Economy (Bridget Vhlliams 
Books, Wellington, 1999) 49. 
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(c) have the opportunity to participate 111, or be kept infonned about, the 
negotiations . 154 
My contention is that these three steps would introduce a greater degree 
of consent into the process whereby New Zealand binds itself into the new 
system of global governance and passes away aspects of its sovereignty. 
Recalling the theo1ies of Locke and Rousseau, such consent would lend the 
product of that process, the new system of global governance, greater legitimacy. 
It is surely vital that the new system of global governance has legitimacy when it 
purports to replace a notion as fundamental to the exercise of power as national 
sovereignty. 
Consent for the power structures of global governance from tbose whose 
lives the structures purport to regulate is also vital for securing the structures' 
sustainability. Without this inforrned consent, any new structures will be racked 
with dissent, disobedience and instability, rendering them dysfrmctional at best, 
and ineffective at worst. The mass demonstrati011s that occur whenever world 
leaders meet to discuss issues associated with globalisation, such as the protests 
in Seattle at the time of the Third Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 1999, 
indicate that there is cunently widespread mistrust about globalisation and a lack 
of consent for the emerging system of global governance. 155 Unless people's 
concerns about globalisation are addressed and their consent for the system 
sought, any new system will struggle to gain acceptance in the long-term. This 
imposes an obligation upon world leaders and those engaged in the globalisation 
process to be more transparent about the potential effects of the process, and to 
engage the world's populations more actively. 
In the final analysis, the fonm1la prescribed by international law and 
institutions, and the political realities associated with them, dramatically alters 
the function of domestic legislators, executive agents, and even of the courts, 
154 Bill Mansfield "The Constraints of Treaties and Intcrnat10nal Law" in Colin James (ed) 
Building the Constitution (Victoria University of Wellington Institute of Policy Studies, 
W elli..ngton, 2000) 110. 
155 See Paolo Galizzi "Globalisation, Trade and the Environment: Broadening the Agenda After 
Seattle? [2000] 4 Env Liability 106, 106-107. 
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through the intertwining of New Zealand's domestic interests witll international 
interests. It replaces the old notion of State sovereignty as the context in which 
power 1s exercised with a new regime of global governance wbere power is 
dispersed among a variety of actors. While is not a bad this per se, the current 
model of global governance lacks a large degree of legitimacy. This cannot be 
allowed to continue when it purports to define the flmdamental basis for how 
power over individuals is to be exercised. If people in the various nations around 
the world are brought into the globalisation process, and can see that it is 
genuinely aimed at delivering a better world, then there appears little problem 
with replacing State sovereignty with global governance. 
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